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This study examines the basic features of the monetary transmission 
mechanism in Turkey in the context of a small aggregate macroeconomic 
model. The core equations of the model consist of aggregate demand, 
wage-price setting, uncovered interest rate parity and a monetary policy rule, 
as well more unique features of the Turkish monetary transmission. The 
model describes how agents set wages and prices in a high inflation 
economy. Changes in exchange rates and interest rates are the primary 
references informing expectations and wage and prices adjust very quickly 
compared to economies such as the UK. Another idiosyncratic feature of 
Turkey is the importance of the high levels of government debt. Following 
Flood and Marion (1996) and Werner (1996), we explicitly model this 
relationship between fiscal and monetary policy by allowing for a currency 
risk premium that depends on the share of Turkish-lira-denominated 
government debt in GDP. The results show how if monetary and fiscal policy 
are not co-ordinated, the monetary transmission mechanism is weak and 
unstable because of the effect of interest rates on the secondary balance 
and the exchange rate risk premium. The results underline the importance of 
recent commitment by the government to achieve primary surpluses in 
Turkey’s new disinflation programme. 
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necessarily those of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.   3
I. INTRODUCTION 
Price stability has become the primary criterion for judging the 
success of monetary policy in recent years. It is also widely accepted 
that the choice of monetary policy to achieve a target path is a 
separate issue from other aspects of government policy such as the 
choice of fiscal policy. However, recent literature suggests that the 
case for such a policy separation is less clear.
1 Agencies responsible 
for inflation stabilisation need to concern themselves with fiscal policy 
choices while the agencies concerned with fiscal policy have a 
corresponding need to consider the implications of their actions for 
monetary stability. The linkages between fiscal and monetary policy 
are weaker in major industrial economies. There, fiscal policy has a 
weaker impact on inflation determination and monetary policy has 
little effect upon the government budget deficit. However, even for 
countries like US and the UK, there exist fiscal-monetary linkages. 
First, monetary policy influences the real value of outstanding 
government debt through its effects upon the price level and upon 
bond prices, and thus the cost of debt servicing. Second, contrary to 
the “Ricardian equivalence” proposition suggesting a neutral impact 
of fiscal policy on aggregate demand, fiscal shocks change the level 
of aggregate demand. Therefore, the fiscal policy stance affects the 
effectiveness of monetary policy even when the monetary policy rule 
has no explicit dependence upon fiscal variables. Woodford (1998) 
shows that a central bank charged with maintaining price stability 
cannot be indifferent to the determination of fiscal policy. If the 
government budget is not expected to adjust according to a Ricardian 
rule, then both the time path and the composition of the public debt 
have consequences for price inflation. 
                                                           
1 Woodford (1998).   4
The main theme of this study is to examine the consequences 
of the co-ordination between fiscal and monetary policies in the 
monetary transmission mechanism using the case study of Turkey. 
The aim is to show how the setting of monetary policy in Turkey 
against a background of persistent budget deficits demonstrates the 
importance of fiscal and monetary policy co-ordination.
2 
In the first half of the 1990s, public finances deteriorated 
markedly and political uncertainty intensified in Turkey. Combined 
with an open capital account, this led to the financial crisis of early 
1994 that resulted in a marked devaluation, triple-digit inflation and a 
deep recession (Figure 1). Turkey’s financial crisis of early 1994 had 
shaped the policies of the second half of 1990s. In the aftermath of 
the crisis, measures were taken to gradually reduce political influence 
on monetary policy and enhance its co-ordination with fiscal policy. 
The Central Bank along with the Treasury built up credibility through 
transparent, and predictable policies. Nonetheless, the fiscal deficit 
and inflation rate continued to increase. The high and chronic inflation 
and large public-sector-financing-requirements combined with a fully 
liberalised exchange rate regime imposed significant constraints on 
the Central Bank’s policy options and left little room for policy 
manoeuvre.
3 The Central Bank aimed at maintaining real interest rate 
stability and a competitive exchange rate rather than more traditional 
goals such as price stability (Figure 2).
4     
                                                           
2 Özatay (1997) analyses the importance of fiscal and monetary policy co-ordination 
in achieving price stability in Turkey over the period between 1977-1995. 
3 The public-sector-borrowing-requirement increased from around 5 percent in the 
late 1980s to 13 percent of GNP in 1999.  
4 See Daniel and Üçer (1999).   5
 
The deterioration in the fiscal position had been the result of 
both substantially negative primary budget balances and high and 
rising interest rates. The high budget deficits had been mainly 
financed through domestic borrowing (Figure 3). Large public sector 
deficits with heavy reliance on domestic financing reduced the private 
sector confidence in the sustainability of fiscal stance and increased 
the risk premium culminating in very high real interest rates.
5 
Henceforth, the ex-post uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) residual 
has a rising trend especially in the second half of 1990s that is 
proxied to the risk premium in the study (Figure 4).     
 
                                                           
5 In the second half of 1990s, the consolidated budget expenditures increased to 36 
percent of GNP from 17 percent, while revenues increased to 24 percent from 14 
percent resulting in a widening budget deficit. The share of interest rate payments in 
GNP rose sharply over the period and by the end of 1999 interest payments 
consisted of almost 40 percent of the total consolidated budget expenditures. In line 
with the financing strategy of the government, interest payments on domestic and 
foreign borrowing had a share of 13 percent and 1 percent of GNP, respectively. 
FIGURE 1





























































































Controlling the underlying factors that have caused the 
inflationary environment, Turkey has shaped the pillars of the recent 
medium term disinflation programme (2000-2002). The programme 
aims to break the inflationary inertia partly through fiscal discipline 
FIGURE 2
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FIGURE 3
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and targets the inflation rate to decline from 65 percent at the end of 
1999 to 25 percent by the end of 2000, and to single digits by the end 
of 2002. The most important component of the program is the 
nominal anchor provided by a forward-looking commitment to the 
exchange rate. The exchange rate has a strong impact on prices via 
expectations formation and imported inflation, and unlike previous 
programmes exchange rate has been chosen explicitly as a nominal 
anchor. The monetary authorities commit to a certain future 
depreciation path for the exchange rate thus providing a forward-
looking approach by the crawling-peg regime. 
 
Meanwhile, the exchange rate commitment is set to be 
supported by a strong fiscal adjustment with a planned increase in the 
primary surplus, and privatisation proceeds as well as an incomes 
policy that links the increase in government sector wages and the 
minimum wage to targeted inflation. Fiscal discipline and real income 
policies are important pillars in the sustainability of the programme. 
FIGURE 4











































































Similar to previous strategies, the guiding rule for the conduct of 
monetary policy is to create domestic liabilities in return for foreign 
exchange assets. There is a pre-announced exit strategy introducing 
a crawling-band regime by mid-2001.
6  
Based on the recent experience of the Turkish economy, the 
study examines the monetary transmission mechanism in the 
framework of a small-scale macroeconomic model. The key 
equations of the model are aggregate demand, wage and price 
setting, interest rate parity condition, debt dynamics and a monetary 
policy rule. Debt dynamics are embedded allowing them to affect the 
risk premium in the uncovered interest rate parity condition. 
The rest of the study is organised as follows: In Section 2, after 
providing a theoretical perspective in the determination of real 
exchange rate, the relationship between debt dynamics and the risk 
premium is modelled. In Section 3, the key equations of the model 
are presented and the underlying factors determining the model 
dynamics are discussed. Section 4 is devoted to the simulation 
results and the last section concludes.    
II. DEBT DYNAMICS AND REAL INTEREST RATE 
DETERMINATION 
II.1. Real Interest Rate Determination and Domestic Debt 
Burden 
To illustrate the theoretical concept of the real interest rate 
determination, consider the following three equilibrium conditions 
given in the system of (2.1.1)-(2.1.3). As quoted by Canzoneri and 
Dellas (1998), equation (2.1.1) is the standard Euler equation that 
                                                           
6 For details see Erçel 1999.   9
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where Et(.) and σ t(.) are conditional expectation and variance 
operators, u(.) is instantaneous utility, β  is the consumer’s discount 
factor,  it is the risk free rate, and  ct+1=E(ct+1). Higher variance of 
consumption leads to a more prudent consumption behaviour by 
promoting precautionary savings (assuming u″> 0). Therefore, either 
current consumption goes down or the risk free rate declines as a 
response to higher future consumption uncertainty. 












       ( 2 . 1.3) 
The second equation, equation (2.1.2), is the standard money 
demand equation in which the real demand for money, m, depends 
on the nominal rate of interest, i, and the marginal utility of 
consumption  u(c). The equation (2.1.3) is the Fisher relationship 
linking the nominal rate of interest to the real rate, irt, via price 
inflation,π .  
Based on the illustration above and following Chadha and 
Dimsdale (1999), factors determining the real interest rate can be 
summarised under five broad headings: (i) Changes in the real rate 
can arise from a change in the behaviour of savings or investment 
owing, for example, to a demographic change in a life-cycle model of 
consumption or a shift in public savings arising from budget deficits or 
surpluses. Changes in the profitability of investment on the account of 
technical progress, fiscal incentives or changes in taxation of profits   10
can result in a shift in investment behaviour; (ii) the Fisher identity, 
equation (2.1.3), considers the full adjustment of nominal interest 
rates to inflation. The adjustment takes place but the process is likely 
to be slow, therefore changes in monetary growth may be expected to 
have persistent effects on real interest rates and hence on real 
variables such as output and employment; (iii) An increase in the 
public debt relative to GDP will require agents to adjust their portfolios 
to hold more government securities. The real yield on government 
bonds should rise in order to encourage this shift in asset portfolios; 
(iv) Governments facing large budget deficits may attempt to reduce 
their cost of borrowing by imposing restrictions on other borrowers. 
Hence, the deregulation of capital markets will tend to raise the real 
interest rate towards the market level and; (v) investors’ perceptions 
of risk have an effect on the real rate of return on a particular security 
via the time varying risk premium. 
As suggested by Chadha and Dimsdale (1999) and Agenor and 
Montiel (1996), large budget deficits have a positive impact of on real 
rates of return in the short run. In countries where financial markets 
are relatively developed and interest rates are market determined, the 
reliance on domestic financing of fiscal deficits may exert a large 
effect on domestic real interest rates. As fiscal deficits are mainly 
financed through domestic sources, a rise in public debt will increase 
the default risk and reduce the private sector’s confidence in the 
sustainability of fiscal stance, leading to an increase in real interest 
rates. The Turkish case is a good example of the positive association 
between fiscal deficits and real interest rates in practice. Between 
1995 and 1999, the public-sector-borrowing-requirement increased 
more than two-fold with more than 90 percent of the deficit being   11
financed through domestic borrowing. Meanwhile, real interest rates 
had been realised above 50 percent (Figure 2).   
II.2. Debt Dynamics and Co-ordination Between Fiscal and 
Monetary Authorities 
As mentioned above, debt dynamics and the interaction 
between fiscal and monetary policy are of particular importance in the 
determination of real interest rates. Following Moalla-Fetini (2000), 
we illustrate the relationship by the subsequent equations. Consider 
that the government debt at time t is determined by the identity 















G P TR I I I D D D + + + + = ∆ + ∆ + ∆  (2.2.1) 
where  ∆  is the first difference operator (∆ xt=xt-xt-1), and
PR
G D is the 
stock of government bonds held by the private sector, 
CB
G D  is the 
stock of government bonds held by the central bank,
FX
G D is the stock 
of government bonds held by the foreign sector, 
PR
G I is interest 
payments on government bonds held by the private sector, 
CB
G I is 
interest payments on government bonds held by the central bank, 
FX
G I interest payments on government bonds held by the foreign 
sector, 
P
GB TR is transfers of profit from central bank to the government 
and  G P  is the primary balance of the government. 
The central bank’s balance sheet can be written as: 






CB ∆ + ∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆     (2.2.2)   12
where 
PR
CB C  is claims on the private sector, 
FX
CB C  is claims on the 
foreign sector, M  is base money and  NW  is the central bank’s net 
worth, and: 








CB − − + + = ∆     (2.2.3) 
where
PR
CB I  is interest receipts of the central bank on private sector 
credits, 
FX
CB I is interest receipts of the central bank on net foreign 
assets,  OP are operating costs of the central bank. By substituting 
(2.2.2) and (2.2.3) into (2.2.1), we get the following expression: 
IP OP P M D + + − = ∆ + ∆      (2.2.4) 









G C C D D D ∆ − ∆ − ∆ + ∆ = ∆ ,      (2.2.5) 








G I I I I IP − − + = .       (2.2.6) 
The resultant consolidated government/central bank budget 
constraint, equation (2.2.4), indicates that the sum of the primary 
deficit and interest payments to the private and foreign sectors should 
be financed either through bond issuance or money creation. The co-
ordination of the fiscal and monetary authorities will determine the 
relative weights of the alternative sources of financing bearing in mind 
that they have a trade-off between lower debt burden against higher 
inflation as they shift towards money creation.
  
Based on the alternative sources of debt financing, Fry (1997) 
states three policy co-ordination frameworks. In the first, the central 
bank determines the change in reserve money providing a partial   13
financing of the government’s deficit, and the remaining deficit is set 
in the light of the other available sources. In the second, the deficit is 
predetermined and the central bank increases reserve money to 
finance the whole deficit. In the third, the change in reserve money 
and the deficit are set independently, leaving the change in 
government debt as the residual. The latter is only possible if interest 
rates are allowed to rise to ensure all debt is sold. 
The general explanation in the literature about the relationship 
between inflation and government deficits views the monetization of 
debt as the way to finance the gap between government expenditures 
and tax revenues. However, substitutability of bond financing and 
money creation can be seen even if government finances its debt 
through bonds. In this case, the increase in nominal stock debt of the 
government is identically equal to the budget deficit that is 
independently set from money creation and central bank accumulates 
larger assets by issuing money that leads a lower level of nominal net 
debt of the consolidated government/central bank. With the existence 
of primary deficits and real interest rate levels exceeding growth rate, 
inflation helps to stabilise the debt to GNP ratio, and that is through 
the transfers of seignorage revenues to the government.
7  
As mentioned above, large public deficits as well as the heavy 
reliance on domestic financing have been important factors 
underlying the sharp increases in real interest rates in Turkey. The 
gradual withdrawal of central bank financing of the government debt 
in the second half of 1990s strengthened the association between 
fiscal deficits and real interest rate.
8 Debt dynamics are of particular 
                                                           
7 Moalla-Fetini (2000). 
8 In 1989, the use of the short-term advance facility by the Treasury was limited to 15 
percent of budgetary expenditure and the practice of using the rediscount facility as a 
tool of selective credit policy ended. The Central Bank Act was revised in October   14
concern when the real interest rate is higher than the growth rate of 
the economy. 
Fry (1997) discusses the stability condition when real interest 
rate exceeds the growth rate. Following previous notation, let the 
government debt to follow a time path that can be expressed as:  
t t t t P r TD TD + + = − ) 1 ( * 1      (2.2.7) 
where the sum of domestic debt and foreign debt is given by 
t t t t e FD DD TD * + = , and rt denotes the approximation for foreign 
and domestic interest rates for simplicity. Both sides of the equation 
(2.2.7) can be divided by gross domestic product (GDP) which grows 
















     (2.2.8) 
where  td is the ratio of government debt to GDP and p is the 
government’s primary balance as a ratio of GDP, which equals 
government expenditure on goods and services g minus tax revenue 
t, also expressed as ratios to GDP. Finally, equation (2.2.8) can be 
expressed in continuously compounded form: 
td r p dtd ) ( γ − + =       ( 2 . 2 . 9 )  
Equation (2.2.9) indicates that, when the real interest rate 
exceeds the real growth rate, the debt to GDP ratio rises unless the 
government runs a primary surplus (p< 0). To avoid explosive 
expansion of debt, the government must spend less on goods and 
services,  g, than its tax revenue, t, i.e. run a primary surplus. By 
                                                                                                                                        
1995. Short-term advances to the Treasury were not to exceed 12 percent of the 
current budget appropriations and this rate was specified as 10 and 6 percent for 
1996 and 1997 respectively, and 3 percent thereafter.   15
setting  dtd=0 in equation (2.2.9), the required primary surplus for 
long-run solvency can be expressed as: 
td r p ) ( γ − = −        ( 2 . 2 . 10) 
In a recent study, Moalla-Fetini (2000) analyses the required 
level of the primary surplus that is consistent with stabilising debt-to-
GNP in Turkey. Larger primary balances need lower inflation rates to 
stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio. On the other hand, for a given level of 
primary balance, a widening in the gap between the real interest rate 
and real growth rate leads to higher inflation rates.
9 
In contrast to the much past research that discusses the 
monetization of debt in the presence of large public deficits, we focus 
on the fiscal impact of debt dynamics on the exchange rate risk 
premium. Excess deficits do not lead automatically to monetization in 
our model. Since we assume that the central bank can issue more 
domestic currency bonds than are necessary to fund the deficit. 
Foreign currency demand is entirely exogenous and where foreign 
and domestic financing are perfect substitutes. Therefore, central 
bank is left with only one of four possible policy options. It can choose 
to control the exchange rate, interest rate, bond issues or money 
supply. Our base-line specification establishes a monetary policy rule 
that targets the interest rate as the instrument, leaving the remaining 
three variables to be determined by market forces.  
II.3. Interest Rate Parity Condition and the Risk Premium  
As discussed in the previous section, the deteriorating fiscal 
position and the heavy reliance on domestic borrowing in financing 
the public debt has been the main reason behind the high and rising   16
real interest rates in Turkey in recent years. Following Flood and 
Marion (1996) and Werner (1996), we explicitly model the impact of 
increasing debt burden on real interest rates by allowing for a 
currency risk premium that depends on the share of Turkish-lira-
denominated debt in GDP. The uncovered interest rate parity 
condition indicates that the domestic nominal interest rate, it, deviates 
from the foreign nominal interest rate level, ift, by the expected rate of 
change of the exchange rate, Et(et+1-et), plus a time varying risk 
premium, q. 
q e E i if e t t t t t + + − = + 1       ( 2 . 3 . 1) 
As suggested in Flood and Marion (1996), the risk premium, q, 
depends on many factors such as the relative private holdings of 
domestic and foreign securities, agents’ attitudes toward risk and 
uncertainty about the future exchange rate. The assumption that the 
risk premium depends on the currency composition of government 
debt is tested by Werner (1996) for Mexico and found that such a risk 
premium works well there during the 1992-1994 period. 
Following the notation of Werner (1996), the interest parity 
condition can be modelled depending on the expected utility 
maximisation of an individual faced with three securities; domestic 
currency denominated government bonds, foreign currency 
denominated government bonds and bonds indexed to the domestic 
price level. The portfolio composition can be expressed in terms of 
the parameters of the model and the structure of returns: 
                                                                                                                                        
9 The analysis suggests that an additional 1 percent primary surplus is required for 2 
percentage of points higher interest rate and an additional 0.6 percent of GNP 
primary surplus is required for each 1 percentage point of lower inflation.   17
) 1 ( ) 1 (
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        ( 2 . 3 . 2 )  
where w denotes total wealth and w denotes the expectation for the 
level of real wealth at the end of the period, i, if, and ip are the interest 
rates on domestic currency denominated bonds, on foreign currency 
denominated bonds and on price indexed bonds. α 1, α 2 and α 3 give 
the portfolio composition in terms of respective fractions of wealth. 
The term τ  is the capital levy rate that gives rise to political risk 
premium, e is the expected rate of depreciation and π  is the expected 
inflation rate. The political levy is assumed to be independent, where 
the depreciation rate and the inflation can be correlated. Based on the 
assumptions, the variance of end-of-period wealth is given by: 
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        ( 2 . 3 . 3 )  
The investor’s utility represented by the function U(w, σ w
2) will 
be positively related to expected wealth and negatively related to the 
variance of the end of period wealth. After some manipulation of the 
first order conditions, the following expression is obtained: 




2 e e e w e if i wU U π π σ σ α σ σ α − − − = − −  (2.3.4) 
where e denotes the expected rate of depreciation. To simplify the 
notation, the risk aversion parameter is renamed by equalizing θ   to 
(Uw/2wUσ )





e e e e if i π π σ σ α α σ θ − − + = −       (2.3.5) 
According to equation (2.3.5), the currency risk premium on 
domestic currency denominated government bonds is proportional to   18
the covariance between the rate of devaluation and the rate of 
inflation,  σ π e. On the other hand, the risk premium on the foreign 
currency denominated government bonds is proportional to the 
difference between the variance of the devaluation rate and the 
covariance between the rate of devaluation and the rate of inflation. 
The interest rate differential depends on the relative shares of 
domestic currency and foreign currency denominated government 
bonds in total debt stock, expected rate of devaluation and the 
variance-covariance structure mentioned above. 
The equation is reduced to the following by assuming that 
purchasing parity holds continuously implying that the covariance 
between the rate of devaluation and the rate of inflation is equal to the 
variance of the rate of devaluation: 
1
2α θσ e e if i + = −         (2.3.6) 
The reduced form of equation (2.3.5) suggests that the 
uncovered interest rate parity condition equalises the differential 
between domestic and foreign interest rate to the expected rate of 
change of the exchange rate plus a time varying risk premium which 
is a function of domestic currency denominated debt to GDP ratio. 
Based on equations (2.2.5) and (2.3.5), we include the 
government debt identity in the equations system of the model and 
have a link to interest rate determination by allowing a time varying 
risk premium as a function of domestic debt to GDP ratio in interest 
rate parity condition.    19
III. MODEL DYNAMICS AND STYLISED FACTS   
The small macroeconomic model developed in this study is an 
aggregate model consisting of core equations of aggregate demand, 
wage and price setting, debt dynamics, uncovered interest rate parity 
and a monetary policy rule. In this section, these key equations of the 
empirical model are presented and the underlying factors determining 
the dynamics are discussed. Fiscal fundamentals, monetary policy 
reaction and expectations formation are the main topics in the 
discussion. 
III.1. The Model 
The framework of the model is given by the following system of 
equations (3.1.1)-(3.1.8). Each equation is motivated in the sections 
that follow: 
Aggregate demand:  
t t t t t t t y y er er ir y 1 2 4 1 3 1 2 1 ) ( ε α α α α + + + − + = − − −  (3.1.1) 
Wage-price setting:  
t t t t t t w pc l yt w 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 ) ( ε β β + + + − = ∆ − − − −    (3.1.2) 
t t
t t t t t t t
E
l yt w e e pc
3 1 5
1 1 1 4 1 3 2 1 1 ) (
ε π χ
χ χ χ χ π
+
+ + − + + ∆ + =
+
− − − − −  
        ( 3 . 1.3) 
Government debt identity: 
 
) 1 /( 1 ) 1 /( 1




t t t t t t t t t
y y
e fd if d i p e fd d
π + − +
+ + + + + − =
−
− − −  
        ( 3 . 1.4)   20
Interest rate parity condition: 
  t t t t t q er ir irf er + + − = + 1      ( 3 . 1.5) 
Risk premium: 
1 2 4 1 − + + = t t t q d q φ φ       (3.1.6) 
Fiscal policy rule: 
1 2 1 − + = t t t p d p ς ς       ( 3 . 1.7) 
Monetary policy rule: 
  t t t ft t t y ir q i 8 0
*
0 1 ) 1 ( ) ( ε δ π π δ π + − + − + + + = +  (3.1.8) 
where all variables, except interest rates and the shares in GNP, are 
expressed in logs. The variable y is the output gap defined as the 
difference between aggregate demand and the natural output level. 
yt,  w and l denote total production, nominal wage rate and 
employment, respectively. i, ir are nominal and real domestic interest 
rates where irf stands for real foreign interest rate. The inflation rate 
and price level are represented by π  and pc respectively, where π * 
denotes the inflation target. er and e denote the  levels of the real and 
nominal rate of exchange rate respectively. In debt identity, d and fd 
denote the shares of domestic currency and foreign currency 
denominated bonds in GDP, respectively, where p represents the 
primary balance. q is the time varying risk premium. E is the 
mathematical expectations operator, and ∆  is the first difference 
operator. Exp points to the exponential form of the variables.    21
III.2. Aggregate Demand - IS Equation 
Aggregate demand equation (3.1.1) explains the dynamic 
relationship between real output, real interest rate and the real 
exchange rate. The equation suggests that the current level of real 
interest and real exchange rate affect the current level of output. The 
real interest rate should have a negative impact, α 1< 0, since a rise in 
real interest rates reduces investment spending due to higher cost of 
capital and encourages savings. A quicker depreciation of domestic 
currency that is denoted by an increase of er makes domestic goods 
cheaper than foreign goods, thereby causing an increase in net 
exports and hence also in aggregate output suggesting a positive 
coefficient,  α 2> 0. Output also depends on its lagged values.
  The 
significance of lagged variables indicates that output is predetermined 
and the current monetary policy actions are ineffective on current 
level of output.
10 
Estimation results of equation (3.1.1) with the Turkish data 
reveal that the current levels of the real exchange rate and real 
interest rate are significant in explaining the output gap.
11  The 
coefficients can be considered to be low, α 1=-0.12, α 2=0.10, for both 
variables, although they have the expected signs.
12 The weak impact 
of real exchange rate on output reflects the inelasticities of real trade 
flows to change in prices. As suggested by Ghosh (2000), Turkish 
trade activity elasticities are higher than price elasticities. Long-run 
                                                           
10 Batini and Haldane (1999) includes a forward-looking term of Etyt+1. A positive and 
significant term indicates that monetary policy can affect output today by affecting 
future expectations of output.  
11 Output gap measures are based on Yalçın (2000). He derives two output gap 
measures for Turkey based on potential output estimations and HP filtering method. 
Both measures give similar results in the aggregate demand equation.   
12 Batini and Haldane (1999) set the real interest rate and real exchange rate 
elasticities to 0.5 and 0.2, respectively.   22
export price elasticity ranges between 0.5 to 1.3 whereas the short-
run price elasticity is estimated to be around 0.4. Şahinbeyoğlu and 
Ulaşan (1999) also show that export demand is price inelastic in 
Turkey. For the import demand equation, the estimation results 
indicate a long-run price elasticity ranging from 0.05 to 0.5 where the 
short-run price elasticity is estimated to be 0.7.  
TABLE 1 
MODEL PARAMETERS 
  Equation / Values   
 IS  curve   
α 1  -0.12  Real interest rate response 
α 2  0.10  Real exchange rate response 
α 3  1.38 Autoregressive  element 
α 4  -0.66 Autoregressive  element 
 Wage-setting   
β 1  0.21  Unit labour productivity 
β 2  -0.24 Autoregressive  element 
 Price-setting   
χ 1  -0.18 Autoregressive  element 
χ 2  0.23  Nominal exchange rate response 
χ 3  0.09  Nominal exchange rate response 
χ 4  0.11  Unit labour cost 
χ 5  1.00*  Inflation expectations response 
 Risk  premium   
φ 1  0.10*  Response to domestic currency debt/GDP ratio 
φ 2  0.60*  Autoregressive element  
 Monetary  Policy  Rule   
δ 0  0.50* Feedback  parameter 
  Fiscal Policy Rule   
ζ 1  -0.10* Feedback  parameter 
ζ 2  0.30* Autoregressive  element 
     (*)Calibrated parameters. 
The relatively low response of output to the changes in real 
exchange rate and in the real interest rate points to a weak power of 
monetary policy actions on the current level of output. The first and 
the second lags of the output are highly significant with estimated   23
coefficients of α 3=1.38 and α 2=-0.66, respectively, suggesting a 
predetermined structure of the output (Appendix, Table 1).  
III.3. Wage-Price Setting 
The wage-price mechanism estimated in the model consists of 
two equations, equations (3.1.2) and (3.1.3), a wage equation and a 
price or mark-up equation, respectively. The mark-up equation gives 
the behaviour of prices or the implicit supply curve of firms where the 
prices are defined as a mark-up over unit labour costs. The wage 
equation gives the behaviour of nominal wages as a function of unit 
labour productivity and past inflation. 
Estimation results of equation (3.1.2) reveal that nominal unit 
labour productivity and past inflation are the main determinants of 
wage setting behaviour in Turkey and wages are quick to adjust to 
changes in the price level as expected in a high inflationary 
environment. The higher the price level compared to nominal wages 
in the previous period, the higher the adjustment in current level of 
nominal wages. The strong and quick pass through is caused by the 
indexed structure of wages and the frequent wage settings in Turkey 
that enhances the inflationary inertia.
13 
According to equation (3.1.3), the pricing behaviour is defined 
as a mark-up over unit labour costs. Output gap measures are 
estimated to be insignificant in the Phillips curve. Along with the 
dynamic homegeneity property, the restriction on the coefficient of the 
inflation expectations that equalizes to unity is not rejected.
14 
                                                           
13 In recent years, public sector wages have been set bi-annually while minimum 
wage is set set on an annual basis. 
14 Following Lyziak (2000), direct measures of expected inflation appear in the 
Phillips curve. Taking into account the need to correct long-run bias resulting both 
from the survey and from the quantification method exploited, the series are adjusted 
in order to impose that the long-run actual inflation is equal to expected inflation (see 
Appendix, Table 2).    24
Therefore, changes in the exchange rate and adjusted inflation 
expectations occur to be significant in affecting price setting 
behaviour in Turkey. Foreign exchange rate changes are important 
either in affecting the cost of production and/or changing the relative 
prices of final goods in the inflation basket. Turkey has a relatively 
open economy with a trade volume of almost 45 percent of GNP, of 
which 60 percent of total imports are intermediary goods and 12 
percent are consumer goods. Meanwhile, almost 50 percent of the 
goods in the basket of consumer price index are tradable goods 
(Appendix, Table 2).  
III.4. Expectations Formation 
The long history of high inflation in Turkey with the lack of 
credibility of the disinflationary programmes led agents to form their 
expectations based on timely data such as changes in interest rates 
and the exchange rate. Additionally, the Central Bank’s actions 
allowing a continuous depreciation of the domestic currency have 
stimulated this process. 
 
FIGURE 5
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Inflationary expectations data derived by the quantification of 
the business tendency survey exhibit a close pattern to both 
consumer and wholesale price inflation.
15 In a chronic inflationary 
environment, agents respond more rapidly to the available   
information in the market. The pattern of rising and volatile real 
interest rates may reflect inflationary expectations rather than 
contractionary monetary policy (Kalkan et al.,1998).
16 
In the case of Turkey with a chronic inflationary environment, 
rising real interest rates have become both the cause and the 
consequence of high inflation. With persistently high levels of public 
debt where real interest rate exceeds the growth rate, markets are 
skeptical about the ability of the monetary authorities to pursue a non-
inflationary monetary policy. A contraction in monetary policy worsens 
the debt dynamics as higher interest rates increase the debt stock 
and raises the possibility of future monetisation of debt. As agents 
anticipate this outcome and incorporate it in their expectations of 
inflation and interest rates, disinflationary policy leads to higher real 
interest rates, slower growth and higher inflation. 
                                                           
15 Kıpıcı (2000) quantifies the qualitative information on price expectations obtained 
from the quarterly tendency surveys in Turkish manufacturing industry.  
16 They analyse the leading indicators of inflation by investigating the macroeconomic 
variables that perform best in predicting inflation in Turkey. By employing time series 
techniques and robustness criterion, the study identifies the inter-bank interest rate 
and the exchange rate basket as the two key leading indicators that survive the 
robustness criteria. The Granger causality running from inflation to various interest 
rates rules out any cost-push or wealth effect type of inflation. The authors point out 
the existence of the expectations channel formed by the interest rates as being timely 
information. The positive relationship might therefore simply reflect inflationary 
expectations rather than contractionary monetary policy.    26
 
In addition to the underlying fiscal fundamentals in the 
inflationary process, the Central Bank’s policy aiming at a constant 
real value for an exchange basket contributed to the inflationary 
inertia. Therefore, the continous nominal depreciation of the Turkish 
lira brought its own inflationary dynamics and exchange rate changes 
had become one of the primary references informing price 
expectations. Consequently, agents follow closely recent trends in 
financial data in particular change in the foreign exchange rate and 
interest rate which are available at a high frequency and set in their 
anticipation of future inflation. In the framework of the model, 
inflationary expectations are assumed to be rational allowing a 
forward-looking approach.  
III.5. The Monetary Policy Rule 
The common theme of monetary policy implementation in the 
second half of 1990s can be generalised as providing stability in 
financial markets, especially in the foreign exchange market. The 
policy strategy was set as controlling the growth in net domestic 
FIGURE 6





































































































































basket interest rate expected inflation-rhs  27
assets and creating domestic liabilities in return for increases in 
foreign assets. The Central Bank announced that it would control the 
depreciation of the Turkish lira in line with the targeted inflation rate. 
The policy aimed at a smooth pattern in the real value for the 
exchange basket was named as the “real exchange rate rule”.
17 
ollowing a price targeting strategy, that is the real exchange rate, 
Central Bank had to adjust its purchases and sales of foreign 
exchange that led to a depreciation rate in line with the inflation rate. 
The trade-off was to lose control over the money supply and the 
Central Bank attempted to control reserve money via the sterilised 
intervention that offset the liquidity implications of the foreign 
exchange operations. 
In line with the Central Bank’s recent experience of targeting an 
exchange rate path consistent with the inflation rate, the monetary 
policy rule equation (3.1.8) sets the real exchange rate consistent 
with the divergence of the actual inflation rate from the targeted level 
and the change in output gap.
18 The feedback parameter is set as 
δ 0=0.50 initially as suggested by the Taylor rule. Alternative values for 
feedback parameter are used for experimenting the influence of 
monetary policy under various concerns of price stability. Experiment 
results are reported in section IV. 
III.6. Uncovered Interest Rate Parity Condition 
Debt dynamics and the relationship between risk premium and 
domestic currency denominated debt to GDP ratio are discussed in 
section 2. In the framework of the model, equation (3.1.4) determines 
                                                           
17 The basket exchange rate comprises of 1 US dollar and 1.5 DM (0.77 Euro).  
18 In the framework of the model, real exchange rate is determined by uncovered 
interest rate parity (UIP) condition. In order to avoid double specification of the real 
exchange rate, we insert the UIP identity in monetary policy rule equation. Due to this 
notation, nominal interest rate changes are treated as monetary policy shocks.        28
the debt accumulation at time t, as a percentage of GDP. Equation 
(3.1.5) is the uncovered interest rate parity condition that determines 
the real exchange rate as a function of domestic and foreign real 
interest rate differential and time varying risk premium where the risk 
premium is linked to domestic currency denominated debt by 
equation (3.1.6). The response of risk premium to domestic currency 
debt to GDP ratio,φ 1, is set 0.1 and autoregressive component, φ 2, is 
set to 0.6. 
IV. SIMULATIONS 
Using baseline parameterisation and the model, we analyse the 
transmission mechanism under two basic experiments of fiscal and 
monetary shocks. As a third case, we compare three alternative 
models under different monetary policy rules.
19 In this section, the 
impulse responses are presented and discussed. 
IVI.1. Experiment 1- An increase in government spending    
The first experiment is an unanticipated one-percentage 
increase in government spending as proxied by an increase of one 
percent in the primary deficit to GDP ratio through quarters 5-8. An 
expansion in the primary deficit will be financed through domestic 
debt which in turn results in an upward pressure on real interest rates 
via increasing the risk premium. 
The expansion in government spending increases total output 
at the time of the shock, however, it is contractionary in the following 
periods due to its positive impact on real interest rates. A one 
percentage increase in the primary deficit increases the domestic 
debt to GDP ratio from its baseline level of 0.30 percent to 0.35 and 
                                                           
19 The model is solved using the Winsolve package and uses Fair-Taylor 
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leads to a higher risk premium due to higher reliance on domestic 
financing. In the long-run, higher real interest rates result in crowding-
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Expansionary fiscal policy experimented involves a one 
percentage point increase in the primary deficit and leads to a higher 
inflation rate after a slight decrease in the first two quarters. The 
increase in the inflation rate is above 0.3 percent on quarterly basis in 
the following quarters of the shock. The monetary policy rule affects 
the trend in real exchange rate based on the changes in output gap 
and inflation rate. Initially, the unanticipated increase in primary deficit 
first leads to a slight depreciation of the domestic currency, however 
after three quarters, monetary policy affects the real exchange rate 
path in line with the inflation rate. As a result, the real exchange rate 
appreciates at a level of 0.1 percent and then depreciates at the 
same level (Figure 7). 
IV.2. Experiment 2- An increase in interest rates 
The second experiment is an unanticipated monetary policy 
shock of one percentage increase in nominal interest rate through 
quarters 5-8. The impulse responses based on the model dynamics 
reveal that the increase in nominal interest rates will lead to a parallel 
increase in real interest rates. The change in real interest rate results 
in an initial appreciation of the domestic currency of above 3 percent 
through UIP and a decline in inflation rates by almost 0.8 percent on 
quarterly basis. As the inflation rate declines and the output gap 
decreases, the exchange rate starts to depreciate as a response to 
the monetary policy rule. The response of the inflation change to the 
contractionary monetary policy is relatively low and short-lived.  
On the fiscal side, the increase in nominal interest rate leads to 
an expansion of domestic debt to GDP ratio through increasing the 
burden of interest rate payments. The domestic debt to GDP ratio 
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domestic debt rises risk premium of almost 0.3 percent that further 
feeds into real interest rate that has a peak at 1.3 percentage level. 
Higher interest rates lead to a tightening in output gap and total 
output. The secondary balance defined as the burden of interest rate 
payments in government deficit rises as a response to increasing 
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IV.3. Experiment 3- The monetary policy rule 
As a third experiment, we evaluate the simulation results under 
different monetary policy rules by solving the alternative models that 
set the feedback parameter, δ 0, as 0.2, 0.5 and 0.9, respectively. The 
fiscal shock that is analysed in the first experiment stated as an 
unanticipated one-percentage increase in government spending 
proxied by an increase of one percent in primary deficit through 
quarters 5-8, is the case in comparison.  
The simulation results reveal that, as the central bank has 
stronger ambition for disinflation, the volatility of the inflation rate and 
of the exchange rate increases. If the monetary authority is more 
active in the disinflationary process by raising interest rate  relatively 
higher levels, δ 0=0.9,  the rate of disinflation is almost three-fold. 
However, the cost is a more volatile exchange rate pattern as the 
response of the real exchange rate will be similar to the case in 
inflation rate. Consequently, in the absence of the co-ordination 
between monetary and fiscal policies, monetary authority has to face 
the trade-off  between market stability and price stability. Unless fiscal 
policy is set in line with the monetary policy, or vice versa, any 
contractionary attempt of the monetary authority will feed into 
government debt through an expansion in secondary deficit and result 
in higher real interest rates, higher appreciation of domestic currency 
and also more volatile price changes (Figure 9 and Figure 10).    33
V. CONCLUSION 
The paper shows that authorities responsible for inflation 
stabilisation need to concern themselves with the stance of fiscal 
policy while the agencies concerned with fiscal policy have a 
corresponding need to co-ordinate their actions with those of the 
monetary policy. The Turkish experience under persistent budget 
deficits provides a good example for the consequence of the co-
ordination of fiscal and monetary policies in achieving the goal of 
price stability. The long history of high and chronic inflation and large 
public-sector-financing- requirements with a fully liberalised exchange 






































































































δο=0.2 δο=0.9 δο=0.5  34
Turkey that aimed at maintaining market stability and a competitive 
exchange rate rather than more traditional goals such as price 
stability. 
The aim of this study is to analyse the basic features of the 
monetary transmission mechanism in Turkey in the context of a small 
aggregate macroeconomic model that provides a broad and stylised 
representation of the whole economy. The estimation results of the 
core equations of the model suggest that wages and prices are very 
quick to adjust and inflationary expectations are more important in the 
price setting behaviour in a high inflationary environment compared to 
more stable economies such as the UK. Large and persistent deficits 
and heavy reliance on domestic financing exert a large fiscal effect on 
real interest rates. In consequence, the high levels of real interest 
rates have become both the cause and the result of high inflation and 
have weakened the monetary policy transmission mechanism. In the 
absence of policy co-ordination between the monetary and fiscal 
authorities, any contractionary attempt of the monetary authority will 
feed into government debt through raising the exchange rate risk 
premium and increasing the debt servicing costs, which will also exert 
a more volatile exchange rate pattern. Monetary policy has to face the 
trade-off between market stability (exchange rate) and price stability. 
The results from this study highlight the importance of recent 
commitment by the Turkish government to achieve primary surpluses 
in the new disinflation program. The most important component of the 
program is the nominal anchor provided by a forward-looking 
commitment to the exchange rate aimed at breaking the inflationary 
inertia. However, the exchange rate commitment is set to be 
supported by a strong fiscal discipline that is posited by the estimation 
and simulation results of this study.   35
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 1: 
ESTIMATION RESULTS OF AGGREGATE 
DEMAND EQUATION 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C0 , 0 0 0 , 11 -0,011 ,00
ir -0,12 0,03 -3,72 0,00
er 0,10 0,03 3,40 0,00
y(-1) 1,37 0,10 13,47 0,00
y(-2) -0,66 0,10 -6,77 0,00
R-squared 0,89     Mean dependent var 0,19
Adjusted R-squared 0,89     S.D. dependent var 2,28
S.E. of regression 0,77     Akaike info criterion 2,42
Sum squared resid 25,58     Schw arz criterion 2,61
Log likelihood -53,01     F-statistic 91,54
Durbin-Watson stat 2,19     Prob(F-statistic) 0,00
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: (1 lag included)
F-statistic 2,14     Probability 0,15
Obs*R-squared 2,33     Probability 0,13
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: (2 lags included)
F-statistic 1,68     Probability 0,20
Obs*R-squared 3,63     Probability 0,16
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: (3 lags included)
F-statistic 1,11     Probability 0,36
Obs*R-squared 3,68     Probability 0,30
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: (4 lags included)
F-statistic 0,95     Probability 0,44
Obs*R-squared 4,27     Probability 0,37
Ramsey RESET Test: (number of fitted terms=1)
F-statistic 0,01     Probability 0,91
Log likelihood ratio 0,02     Probability 0,90
Ramsey RESET Test: (number of fitted terms=2)
F-statistic 0,52     Probability 0,60
Log likelihood ratio 1,21     Probability 0,55
Ramsey RESET Test: (number of fitted terms=3)
F-statistic 0,50     Probability 0,69
Log likelihood ratio 1,75     Probability 0,63
Ramsey RESET Test: (number of fitted terms=4)
F-statistic 1,16     Probability 0,34
Log likelihood ratio 5,38     Probability 0,25
Jarque-Bera 0,60
Dependent Variable:y
Included observations: 48 after adjusting endpoints
Equation 3.1.1.
Sample(adjusted): 1987:3 1999:2
Method: Least Squares  39
TABLE 2:  
ESTIMATION RESULTS OF WAGE-PRICE SYSTEM 
 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C(1)- 0 , 9 1 0,39 -2,32 0,02
C(2) -0,23 0,08 -2,79 0,01
C(3) 0,21 0,08 2,74 0,01
C(11) -0,22 0,26 -0,84 0,41
C(12) -0,20 0,08 -2,40 0,02
C(13) 0,23 0,06 4,140 , 0 0
C(14) 0,10 0,04 2,30 0,02
C(15) 0,130 , 0 62 , 150 , 0 3
C(24) 0,57 0,23 2,47 0,02
C(25) 0,64 0,34 1,89 0,06
C(26) -0,01 0,03 -0,44 0,66
Determinant residual covariance 2,47E-09
Equation: D(LW)=C(1)+C(2)*LW(-1)+C(3)*(LY(-1)-LL(-1)+LCPI(-1))
Observations: 40
R-squared 0,17     Mean dependent var 0,15
Adjusted R-squared 0,13     S.D. dependent var 0,06
S.E. of regression 0,06     Sum squared resid 0,12
Durbin-Watson stat 2,18
Equation: D(LCPI)=C(11)+C(12)*LCPI(-1)+C(13)*D(LIMP)+C(14)*LIMP(-1)
        +C(15)*(LW(-1)+LL(-1)-LY(-1))+(1-C(24))*EXPINF/(C(25))
Observations: 40
R-squared 0,55     Mean dependent var 0,14
Adjusted R-squared 0,47     S.D. dependent var 0,05




R-squared -0,10     Mean dependent var 0,19
Adjusted R-squared -0,16     S.D. dependent var 0,03




Chi-square 0,69 Probability 0,41
Instruments: LW(-1) LY(-1)-LL(-1) LCPI(-1) LIMP D(LIMP) LY-LL C
System: Wage-Price Setting
Equations 3.1.2, 3.1.3 and corrections to inflation expectations. 
Estimation Method: Iterative Three-Stage Least Squares
Sample: 1990:1 2000:2    40
 